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Introduction
Competition in the workplace is an astonishing and widespread phenomenon (e.g. (Marino and Zabojnik 2004) ). This kind of internal competition is characterized by several employees who are hired by the same employer and who try to outperform one another in order to receive higher wage or bonus payments. The phenomenon is of great empirical relevance as companies involving multiple employees are frequent in the eld.
In an experiment, competition on the workplace could be analyzed as a gift-exchange game, however, the standard version of that game 1 is not suitable for two reasons. The rst reason concerns the number of employees per rm. Most papers focus on setups where each employer hires exactly one employee, 2 this is why these papers do not cover the full depth and breadth of these internal competition mechanisms. The second prerequisite relates to the timing of the game: in the standard workhorse model employees act as second movers, i.e., they have a strong incentive to exert low eort levels which, reduces their incentives to outperform each other.
3 We circumvent these problems by using the modied gift-exchange game introduced by Abeler, Altmann, Kube and Wibral (2010) where two employees are matched to one employer and where the timing is reversed.
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There is a growing literature on gift-exchange games with multiple employees, 5 but none of them addresses competition in the workplace.
Concerning employees' eort choices, most papers do not report signicant changes compared to the standard giftexchange game (e.g., Charness and Kuhn (2007) or Maximiano, Sloof and Sonnemans (2007)). Gächter and Thöni (2010) nd that employees care greatly about disadvantageous wage inequality when workers receive a lower wage compared to their co-worker, they decrease their future eort levels. There are also studies reporting the workers' reactions to wage cuts (Gächter and Sefton (2008) and Cohn, Fehr, Herrmann and Schneider (2011) ). These papers show that workers' performance signicantly decreases after the experience of a wage reduction when their co-workers' wage is held constant. Although all these studies do investigate multiple-employees setups they are suciently dierent to our paper. In contrast to these papers our main interest is not based on the consequences of unequal wage payments, but rather on the dynamics of the competition in the workplace phenomenon in multiple workers environments.
If employers pay higher wages to the employees who exert a higher eort level compared to their co-worker it can be considered as an implicit rank-order tournament where 1 Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) . The literature on gift-exchange games is huge (for a survey see Gächter and Fehr (2002) or Charness and Kuhn (2011) ). 3 Engelmann and Ortmann (2009) nd that responder behavior in gift-exchange games where employers rst move is very sensible to parametrization, i.e., responders often tend to exploit proposers.
workers are paid according to their relative performance. Lazear and Rosen (1981) show theoretically that this kind of payment structure can result in optimal allocations if workers are risk neutral. Since tournament incentives are crucial for competition in the workplace we will control if employers in our experiment create these incentives by oering extra payments to workers who exert a higher eort level than their co-workers. These more productive workers would receive a payment similar to a bonus payment additional to the normal wage payment which only relates to the chosen eort level. 
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Our results emphasize that the employers set the tournament incentives which allow competition in the workplace to occur. This is why individual eort choices are increased, especially in the early periods of the game, when a signicant learning process can be found. Furthermore we show that imitation learning 8 serves as an explanation for this learning process. The data highlights that employers are also aected by competition between the workers. In the competitive treatment they signicantly reduce their generosity towards the employees over time. In the non-competitive treatment this eect vanishes.
Our paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present our experimental design and our results are presented in Section 3, Section 4 concludes.
Experimental Design and Procedures
In this experiment we consider a two-stage game with two dierent types of players:
employers and employees who are matched into rms. Compared to the standard giftexchange game the timing of our game is reversed: in the rst stage the employees choose an eort level and in the second stage the employers determine a wage payment for the employees. We choose this approach, as employees have the possibility to shirk in the standard gift-exchange game, i.e., they can choose minimum eort levels despite of having received positive wage payments. This aspect complicates the formation of competitive pressure between the workers as they both have an incentive not to exert above minimum eort levels. This is why the reversed gift-exchange game is better suited to tackle our research questions.
Eort is costly to employees and benecial to the employer while wages are benecial to employees and costly to the employer. The workers' and employer's actions and the corresponding payos are exactly the same as in Abeler et al. (2010) . One unit of eort gift-exchange study. The authors report that low-skilled agents show enhanced social learning and are more likely to reject an oered contract menu after their teammate also rejected a contract menu in the previous period. Eort Level e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Costs c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 20 Table 1 : Eort -Cost-of-eort relation increases the payo of an employer by 10 units, whereas the employees' payo is reduced by respective eort costs (see Table 1 ). Employees can choose eort levels between one and 10. The wages paid by the employer must not exceed 100. They subtracted from the employer's payo and allotted to the employees.
We compare two dierent treatments: the Single-Employee-Treatment (SET), and the Multiple-Employees-Treatment (MET). Following Abeler et al. (2010) , the base game of both treatments is repeated for 12 periods and a random matching routine is employed.
In contrast to Abeler et al. (2010) , the only dierence between our treatments is the number of employees per rm: in SET there is only one employee per rm whereas rms consist of one employer and two employees in MET. We also applied a slight change in SET payos compared to the payos used in Abeler et al.: to avoid wealth eects and to ensure comparability, we doubled employers' payos' for SET as reported in Table 2 which summarizes the players' payos.
Treatment
Payo Employer Payo Employee i In MET both employees are paid from the money generated by their eort choices. The employer has to decide on the wages for both employees. Evidence of prior gift-exchange games (e.g., Fehr et al. (1993) ) suggests that due to reciprocal behavior employees exert higher levels of eort if employers pay higher wages. Due to the reversed timing, it should be the employers who show reciprocal behavior. However, as employers can observe the eorts of both workers it might be that tournament incentives are implicitly set -as the move order is reversed, employers can easily reward higher eort choices. That is, they can pay higher wages to employees who exert a higher eort, yielding competition for high wages amongst the employees. The dierence in the number of employees per rm therefore enables us to control for this competition in the workplace eect generated by the existence of a second employee.
The experiment was conducted in November 2010 at the AWI Lab of the University of Heidelberg using the z-Tree software package by Fischbacher (2007) and Greiner's (2004) online recruitment system. At the beginning of the experiments participants were randomly placed into matching groups which remained constant for the whole session.
Each matching group comprised three rms, i.e., three employers and three workers in SET and three employers and six workers in MET. At the beginning of each period the members of a matching group were randomly matched into rms. This procedure resulted in nine independent observations for the SET and four independent observations for the MET. we analyze 12 independent observations for MET and nine independent observations for SET.
In total, 90 subjects participated in our experimental sessions. In SET 54 subjects took part and 36 subjects participated in our MET-sessions. In both treatments the base game was repeated 12 times and a session took about one hour. Each participant started with an endowment of 400 points which also served as show-up fee for the participants. The prots achieved by the participants were converted at an exchange rate of 0.01 Euro/point.
This resulted in an average payo of e 10.33 which corresponded to about $14.05 at that point in time.
Results
In this section we present the results of our experiment. First, we analyze whether the employers explicitly set tournament incentives as this behavior is a prerequisite for competition in the workplace. Second, we present the employees' average eort levels and the corresponding statistical analyses. Finally we consider the development of these eort levels over time and analyze the employers' behavior dependent on eorts exerted. We report two-sided p-values throughout.
Competition in the workplace
Due to the existence of the second employee the employers have the possibility to set tournament incentives, 9 i.e., to pay a premium to those employees exerting higher eorts than their co-worker (henceforth high types and low types). We therefore analyze wage payments for high and low types in MET. We nd evidence for tournament incentives set by the employers, that is, high types receive higher wages (36.69) whereas low types only receive a wage of 19.26. These dierences in our results cannot be exclusively explained by the eort levels. It also seems that agents exerting a higher eort than their coworkers receive a premium simply for being more diligent. The independent variables of the regression are eort (which represents the eort chosen by the employees), and higher (which is a dummy variable equal to one if a subject has chosen a higher eort than his co-worker). Furthermore, we control for the corresponding period (1-12). The OLS regression reveals that eort and higher are signicant. That means, higher eort levels increase employees' wages. It also shows that employers pay higher wages to workers who outperform their co-workers in contrast to workers who do not win the tournaments. We thus nd support that tournament incentives are set by our employers. Finally, we nd that workers receive lower wages in later periods (we will discuss this in more detail in section 3.4). Result 1 The employers trigger internal competition between the employees by making an extra payment to employees who exert a higher eort level compared to their co-worker. 
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Result 2 On average the introduction of a second employee does not result in increased eort levels. However, in periods 1-6 there is an intense increase of eorts in the competitive treatment whereas there is no such increase in the non-competitive treatment.
Behavior over time
The development of the average eort levels over time is signicantly dierent across treatments which is illustrated by Figure 1 . It comprises both treatments: the blue line which represents SET and the black line which depicts MET. In general, the MET eort levels are higher than the SET eort levels.
12 Considering the early periods (the rst half of the game, periods 1-6) we nd a steep increase of eorts in MET, 13 i.e., in MET there is a positive correlation between eort and period in the rst half of the game (sign-test p-value < 0.01). There is no such correlation in SET. The sign-test p-value for periods 1 -6 is 0.289, hence, in contrast to MET we cannot reject the null-hypothesis of no correlation between eort and period in SET.
14 11 We will return to learning behavior later on.
12 Note that the black line is above the blue line in each single period except period 2.
13 In the early periods, 11 out of 12 matching groups have Spearman's rank correlation coecients between eort and period that are positive.
14 The periods 3-9 seem to be a more promising choice to detect a correlation eort and period in SET (compare Figure 1) . In this interval there is also no signicant correlation, the corresponding p-value is 0.180. Result 3 In MET eort levels correlate positively and signicantly with the period variable during the early periods of the game. This type of correlation cannot be found in SET.
Imitation learning
One possible driver for the dierent dynamics is imitation learning, 15 a simple learning process suggesting that players imitate the most successful action choice of the previous period. The concept of imitation learning cannot be applied in the SET treatment because there is only one employee who is employed by an employer. Therefore this worker would not obtain any information about the eort level a co-worker might chose. In contrast,
MET employees have all the information necessary to make use of the imitation heuristic by monitoring the eort levels chosen by their co-workers. It is the aim of this subsection to gure out whether imitation learning is present in MET.
In this analysis we focus on a subsample of our dataset. We restrict our regression to observations where subjects earned less than their co-worker in the previous period.
Otherwise imitation learning would suggest that a large fraction (about 67% of all cases in MET) of employees leave their eort choices unchanged and this may bias the results. (1) 
where e i,t and e i,t−1 denote the eort choice of subject i in period t and period t − 1, respectively. imit denotes the dierence between the most successful eort choice of the previous period and the eort level chosen by the corresponding subject in the previous period, i.e., imit always species the exact change of an imitation player's eort choice between period t−1 and t. It contains integers between -10 and 10 if the employee was less successful than his co-worker. If both employees received the same payos in the previous period, we assume that imitation players consider only the lowest eort choice because it is less risky. imit_nv is an interaction term between imit and the nv variable which is a dummy indicating whether the corresponding subject experienced a disadvantageous norm violation in the previous period (see Abeler et al. (2010) ). Advantageous norm violations are not covered by this analysis as we consider only observations of subjects who earned less than their co-worker in the previous period.
The regression results are reported in Table 6 . We nd that the employees are prone to imitation. In our rst regression we do not control for norm violations and nd that the eort changes are largely in line with the imitation predictions. The imit coecient is approximately 0.5 and highly signicant.
Furthermore we infer that norm violations have a signicant and substantial impact on the eort choices. The coecient for the dummy is about -2 and the coecient for the interaction term about -0.74, both coecients are highly signicant. The sign of the sum of the imit and imit_nv coecients is particularly striking: it is negative, indicating that the employees still use the information about their co-worker to adjust their eort choices. Yet this adjustment based on the information about the other employee results in an increase of the eort levels and not in the decrease predicted by imitation learning.
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Our results do imply a decrease of an employee's eorts after a norm violation but this decrease is captured by the nv dummy which represents a general eort decrease that is not related to imitation learning. This is why we conclude that norm violations can be interpreted as a disturbance of imitation learning: the employees do not comply with the concept's predictions after experiencing a norm violation.
Result 4 Imitation learning can explain the dierent developments of the average eort levels across treatments. Norm violations can be interpreted as disruptions of the imitation learning process.
Employers' reactions
The results reported so far are evidence that the employers' behavior is also aected by the existence of a second employee. In section 3.1 we showed that employers pay lower wages in later periods, the imitation behavior we observed in section 3.3 may also aect the employers' decision-making process. Employers anticipating the employees' imitation behavior may adapt to this kind of behavior, e.g., by paying very low wages to employees exerting low eort levels. There are, however, numerous other explanations why the employers' behavior may change. This is why the following paragraphs analyze the employers' reactions to the existence of the second employee.
Figure 2: Development of Reciprocity over Time Figure 2 shows the development of the average wage payments per unit of eort exerted (WPE). Even though the WPE measure has comparable levels across treatments there is a substantial dierence regarding the dynamics. In SET there is no distinct development of this measure: there is no apparent dierence between the WPE of the early periods in SET compared to the last periods of the game. However, in MET a clear eect can be 16 Imitation will always predict eort decreases if there was a disadvantageous norm violation in the previous period. A negative coecient of the interaction term therefore indicates a positive change of eort levels.
found, i.e., there is a decreasing trend of the average wage payments per unit of eort.
In contrast to the early periods, employers signicantly decrease their wage payments in the nal periods. The time trend of the average wage payments per unit of eort exerted is also signicantly dierent across treatments. In MET there is a signicantly negative correlation between the period variable and the average wage payment per unit of eort exerted (sign-test p-value = 0.038), but there is no such correlation in SET (sign-test p-value = 0.508).
17 A decreasing trend in MET can be observed but there is no such development in SET. It can be clearly seen that in MET the wages paid per eort interval decreases in periods 7-12 compared to periods 1-6. This holds true for every eort interval. When eorts were below ve, average wage payments decrease in periods 7-12 from 6.7 (periods 1-6) to 5.4 (periods 7-12). This dierence is statistically signicant (Wilcoxon matchedpairs test p-value = 0.028). For 5≤e<8 average wages also decrease from 20.9 (periods 1-6) down to 19.6 (periods 7-12). However, this dierence is statistically not signicant (Wilcoxon matched-pairs test p-value = 0.824). When employees' average eort level was 8≤e≤10, average wages also decreased from 35.8 (periods 1-6) to 32.3 (periods 7-12). This dierence is weakly signicant (Wilcoxon singrank test p-value = 0.100). If we focus on the diagram for SET, we do not observe these ndings at all: in each of the three intervals there is nearly no development over time. That is, employers always choose the same average wage for each of the three eort intervals. These results once more underline that the employers' reciprocity decreases over time in the presence of two workers. Because of competition in the workplace between workers in MET, employers seem to play the two workers o against each other by systematically decreasing individual wages.
Result 5 In contrast to SET the wages paid per unit of eort decrease over time in MET.
In this environment with two employees, employers decrease their reciprocal behavior in the second half of the game.
Conclusion
How should an ecient workplace be designed? Our results may give answer to this question. We nd that employing more than one worker results in a clear cut improvement of employees' eort levels over time because employers can induce tournament incentives by systematically rewarding workers who outperform their co-worker. Workers in the multiple employee treatment are therefore faced with competitive pressure and increase their eort levels compared to the single employee case. Even though competition in the workplace does not aect the aggregate eort levels, competition intensies over time.
In particular, there is a distinct, increasing development of the eort levels in the rst The analysis also shows that a second employee working for the same employer inuences employers' behavior. The increasing competitive pressure between the workers forces employees to raise their eort choices over time. The data documents that employers anticipate this. We nd that employees systematically pay a smaller wage for each unit of exerted eort over time. This nding is striking because there has not been any other gift-exchange study which reports decreasing levels of reciprocity over time.
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19 The prevalance of reciprocity in gift-exchange games is well-documented in the literature (Gächter and Appendix: MET-Instructions 1 Welcome to this experiment on decision making.
Please read these instructions carefully. At the end of these instructions you will be asked to answer several control questions. The experiment will begin as soon as each participant answered the control questions correctly. The experiment is anonymous, i.e., you will not get to know with which other participants you are interacting.
During the experiment you can earn "Experimental Currency Units" (ECU). Your earnings depend on your decisions and on the other participants' decisions as well. After the experiment the ECUs will be converted into Euros at the following exchange-rate:
ECU = Cent
Please wait at your desk until we ask you to come to receive your payment. After the experiment, please bring all the documents we handed out to the place where you will receive your payment.
You begin with a starting capital of 400 ECUs (€4,-). It increases if you make profits and it decreases if you experience losses during the experiment. Note, that you can always rule out the possibility of making losses by your own decisions.
Please also note that you must not talk to the other participants during the experiment. In this case we need to abort the experiment immediately. If you have any questions please raise your hand and we will answer them personally.
In this experiment participants either act as an employer or as an employee. At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned one of these roles. Your role does not change during the experiment.
The experiment will be repeated for 12 periods. In each period participants are randomly divided into groups of three people. Each group consists of one employer and of two employees called employee 1 and employee 2. Your decisions are only reported to the other two members of your current group. The other participants are not informed about your decisions.
Each period comprises two stages. In the first stage employee 1 and employee 2 each choose an effort level. Their decision is independent of the other employee's decision. There are ten different effort levels the employees may choose. The lowest possible effort level is 1 and the highest one is 10. Each unit of effort exerted by an employee produces 10 ECUs for the employer. For instance if the effort level is 1 the employer will receive 10 ECUs, if the effort level is 2 the employer will receive 20 ECUs, etc. If the effort level is 10 the employer receives 100 ECUs.
Choosing an effort level is costly for the employees. The higher the effort level, the higher the corresponding costs. However, the costs only depend on the effort level an employee chooses for himself. The effort level chosen by the other employee does not affect the costs. For an employee, the costs of choosing an effort are as follows: In the second stage the employer is informed about the effort choices of employee 1 and employee 2. After that the employer chooses wage payments w1 and w2 for employee1 and employee2, respectively. The wage payments for the employees may either be equal or different. A wage payment for an employee must not be lower than 0 ECUs and it must not exceed 100 ECUs.
At the end of a period both employees and the employer are informed about the effort levels, about the wage payments and about the resulting profits.
Thus, in each period, a participant's profit in ECUs is as follows:
Employer's profits = 10 x effort level chosen by employee 1 + 10 x effort level chosen by employee 2 -wage payment for employee 1 (w1) -wage payment for employee 2 (w2) Employee 1's profits = wage payment for employee 1 (w1) -cost of effort chosen by employee 1 Employee 2's profits = wage payment for employee 2 (w2) -cost of effort chosen by employee 2
At the end of the experiment, you will receive your total profits. They consist of the starting capital and the sum of the profits earned in each period of the experiment.
Effort screen
Below, you can see a screenshot of the input screen an employee is faced with when choosing his effort level. The effort-cost-of-effort relation and the amount of profits generated for the employer are reported in the lower area of the screen. The employees choose their effort levels in the upper part of the screen and confirm their choice by clicking the red button. This screen is only visible for employees.
Wage payments screen
Below, you see the screen employers face when they determine the wage payments w1 and w2. It displays detailed information on the effort choices, the corresponding costs and the profits generated in the upper part of the screen. The employer can enter wage payments in the blue input boxes in the middle of the screen. By clicking on the "This would result in..." button", the employer may calculate the profits resulting for himself and for both employees. If desired, the employee may enter and try different wage payments by clicking the blue input boxes and the "this would result in ..." button again. Finally, the employer confirms his final choice by clicking the red button. This screen is only visible for employers.
Feedback screen
At the end of each period, the employees are informed about their wage payment in the upper part of the feedback screen. In the middle of this screen a summary of choices and profits of the corresponding period is displayed. In the lower part, employees can track their total profits, i.e., their starting capital plus the sum of their earnings in previous periods. The screenshot below is an example screen for employees. The screen the employers face is similar but here, the upper part is empty.
Please raise your hand if you have any further questions.
